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Abstract 
The concept of polarization is linked to the extent that a given distribution leads to the 
formation of homogeneous groups with opposing interests. This concept, which is 
basically different from the traditional one of inequality, is related to the level of 
inherent potential conflict in a distribution. The polarization approach has been widely 
applied in the analysis of income distribution. The extension of this approach to the 
analysis of international distribution of CO2 emissions is quite useful as it gives a 
potent informative instrument for characterizing the state and evolution of the 
international distribution of emissions and its possible political consequences in terms 
of tensions and the probability of achieving agreements. In this paper we analyze the 
international distribution of per capita CO2 emissions between 1971 and 2001 through 
the adaptation of the polarization concept and measures. We find that the most 
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interesting grouped description deriving from the analysis is a two groups’ one, which 
broadly coincide with Annex B and non-Annex B countries of the Kyoto Protocol, 
which shows the power of polarization analysis for explaining the generation of 
groups in the real world. The analysis also shows a significant reduction in 
international polarization in per capita CO2 emissions between 1971 and 1995, but not 
much change since 1995, which might indicate that polarized distribution of emission 
is still one of the important factors leading to difficulties in achieving agreements for 
reducing global emissions. 
 
JEL codes: D39; Q43; Q56. 




There are strong differences in the levels of emissions caused by the inhabitants of 
different parts of the world. The analysis of the international distribution of CO2 
emissions is very important for analyzing climate change and designing policies to 
mitigate it. The inequality in per capita CO2 emissions between countries shows 
different responsibilities in the generation of greenhouse gases and the contribution to 
climate change. Therefore, the analysis of this inequality sheds light on the debate 
about the different control and mitigation measures to be applied in different regions. 
In fact, distribution problems have become the most important issue to deal with in 
global climate change policy negotiations and agreements. Taking distribution 
problems properly into account in policy design leads to an increase in the perceived 
fairness of the measures and facilitates widespread participation.  
 
Although rich countries are responsible for much higher emissions in per capita terms, 
the impressive rates of growth in absolute emissions in some expanding economies, 
such as China and India, means any solution involving the stabilization of greenhouse 
emissions (as mandated by the UNFCCC) requires the participation of both richer 
countries and developing economies in order to control global emissions. The climate 
change policy involves establishing limits to the level of global emissions and 
distributing this level among the different countries or groups of countries. These 
limitations might involve economic sacrifices. There are several approaches on the 
distribution of future emissions “entitlements”
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 and on the distribution of abatement 
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 The proposals for the distribution of entitlements are based on current emission levels (e.g. Pearce and 




. The analysis of emissions distribution should also be useful for informing the 
debate on the distribution of emissions entitlements.  
 
The above reasons explain why, in recent years, several works have appeared 
focusing on the distributive analysis of environmental issues and, in short, on the 
analysis of CO2 emissions and energy consumption. Hedenus and Azar (2005) employ 
the Atkinson inequality index for analyzing the evolution of inequality in various 
natural resources. With respect to the analysis of the inequalities in energy intensity 
we can cite the papers by Sun (2002) and Alcántara and Duro (2004). The works by 
Heil and Wodon (1997, 2000), and Padilla and Serrano (2006) introduce various 
indexes taken from income distribution analysis for measuring and studying the 
evolution of the international inequality in CO2 emissions. Heil and Wodon (1997) 
employ a group decomposition of the Gini coefficient for analyzing the inequality in 
per capita CO2 emissions and the contribution of two income groups (rich and poor 
countries) to this inequality. Heil and Wodon (2000) employ this methodology for 
analyzing future inequality in per capita emissions using projections to year 2100, as 
well as considering the scenario under the impact of the Kyoto Protocol and other 
reduction measures. Padilla and Serrano (2006) employ concentration indexes and 
show that the inequality between rich and poor countries (inequality in emissions 
between countries ordered by the increasing value of per capita income) have been 
reduced less than the “simple” inequality in emissions, and use the decomposition of 
                                                                                                                                            
entitlements in per capita terms (e.g., Grubb, 1990; Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Meyer, 1995), and 
different combinations of these criteria.  
2
 The proposals for distributing costs are mostly based on the “polluter pays” principle and indexes of 
ability to pay (see IPCC, 1996; section 3.5., pp. 103-112). 
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the Theil index for showing the contribution of four income groups to inequality. 
Duro and Padilla (2006) decompose the international inequality in CO2 emissions into 
the different Kaya factors and two interaction terms, also undertaking the analysis 
between and within groups of countries, so explaining the main sources of emissions 
inequality.  
 
However, the notion of inherent conflict or instability of the international distribution 
of emissions, which might be important in problems such as climate change where 
emissions’ reduction needs from agreement, is not conveniently captured by the 
inequality approach
3
. In this sense, a concept which explicitly includes this aspect has 
recently been developed and extended to other academic fields: the concept of 
polarization. 
 
The notion of polarization consists in examining the degree to which the observations 
of a distribution—in our case, countries and their per capita CO2 emissions—are 
allocated around different poles, and therefore are forming significantly homogeneous 
groups which are different between them. Under the polarization approach, conflicts 
will depend on the degree to which internally compact groups and with antagonistic 
interests might be constituted. This duality in the distribution would be a more 
feasible scenario for the appearance of stress and instabilities than a scenario with low 
polarization. Therefore, this distributive notion seems particularly relevant, insofar as 
it is linked closely to the possibility of the outbreak of conflicts.  
In the same way as happens with the measurement of inequality, in order to make 
operative the concept, the measurement of polarization requires the employment of 
                                                 
3
 The surveys by Theil (1967), Sen (1973) and Cowell (1995) are classic references on these issues. 
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synthetic indexes. Among the most important proposals in the literature, the group of 
indexes suggested by Esteban et al. (1999) is quite appealing and seems superior to 
other alternatives, such as the Wolfson (1994) index or the measure proposed by 
Zhang and Kanbur (2001). 
 
The analysis of polarization has been applied mainly in the field of personal income 
distribution (see e.g., Esteban et al., 1999; Gradín, 2000, D’Ambrosio, 2001; and 
Duro, 2005). Its application to the analysis of environmental problems is still very 
rare
4
. However, current discussions on global environmental problems, such as 
climate change, reinforce the utility of extending polarization analysis to the study of 
international distribution of CO2 emissions. These discussions are partly focused on 
the duality between more polluting and less polluting countries (i.e. the discussion 
between homogeneous groups of countries—in terms of their polluting behavior—
which are heterogeneous between them). Moreover, the main objective of these 
discussions consists in controlling and reducing global emissions and redistributing 
them among countries by means of a multilateral negotiation. This leads to a logical 
formation of coalitions, which are typically related to countries with similar situations. 
In this negotiation, the likelihood of achieving agreement depends on the duality 
between countries. 
 
Therefore, polarization analysis complements inequality analysis by giving a more 
complete characterization of the international distribution of per capita emissions. It 
gives us indications on the degree of inherent potential tensions of this distribution. It 
                                                 
4
 The only reference we have found is the recent work by Ezcurra (2007), who computes an index of 
polarization in CO2 emissions for 87 countries among other instruments for analyzing CO2 
convergence.  
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might be the case that international inequality in per capita emissions had declined 
(see e.g. Heil and Wodon, 1997; Duro and Padilla, 2006; Padilla and Serrano, 2006) 
but polarization increased. Moreover, if both distributive measures evolved in a 
similar way, then they would reinforce the conclusions in informative terms. 
 
But the utility of polarization analysis does not only centers on the evaluation of its 
time pattern. There is also great interest in knowing which are the groups 
“theoretically” conformed according to their polluting similarity, in knowing which 
are the members of these groups, and in contrasting if such predicted groups are 
verified in reality. In short, it is interesting checking if the groups predicted by the 
polarization approach are similar to the groups finally established in real negotiations, 
such as the Kyoto Protocol (e.g., Annex B and non-Annex B countries). Their 
coincidence would reinforce the capacity of polarization analysis as a tool predicting 
coalitions’ formation and, as a consequence, evaluating the potentiality of conforming 
agreements according to a given distribution. 
 
The main aim of this article is therefore to adapt and apply these polarization indexes 
to analyze the international distribution of CO2 emissions. To our knowledge, this is 
the first attempt to make use of the potential of the polarization concept and 
measurement for analyzing CO2 emissions distribution. The available data will allow 
us to undertake the analysis for the time period 1971–2001 and include 116 countries, 
which is equivalent to more than 99% of estimated world population and emissions. 
Besides the reference polarization analysis of per capita CO2 emissions, including all 
the countries and weighting through population-shares, we have developed two more 
exercises. Firstly, we have compared the results with the case where all countries were 
treated homogenously, independently of their population, following the typical 
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practice developed by the income convergence literature. Secondly, we have verified 
the degree of variability of the results when China and India are excluded from the 
analysis, given their large size and their impressive recent development.  
 
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 reviews the concept of 
polarization and the measures suggested in the literature. Section 3 carries out an 
empirical application adapting the more appropriate polarization measures for the 
analysis of international distribution of per capita CO2 emissions. Section 4 computes 
polarization values when all countries are treated uniformly, independently of their 
population, and also when China and India are excluded from the sample. Section 5 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. Measuring polarization: some methodological aspects 
The basic idea underlying the concept of polarization is its capacity to measure in an 
appropriate way the inherent potential instability in a given distribution. 
Unfortunately, the conventional indexes of inequality and convergence are ineffective 
as measures of polarization. Let us imagine a hypothetical distribution in which only 
one country—with a small relative population weight—has a positive level of CO2 
emissions per inhabitant while the other countries do not emit CO2 at all. This extreme 
scenario would be perceived by the conventional indexes of inequality (like the Gini 
coefficient) as a situation of maximum inequality (the Gini would be 1). However, 
this would probably not be the worst possible situation in terms of conflict and 
instability. Probably, if this was the scenario, it would not be difficult to convince this 
country to modify its behavior, given its predictable small relative power associated 
with its marginal relative population weight. That is, small groups, with a small 
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relative population weight, would be not very important in terms of potential 
instability, in clear contrast to the perception established by the traditional inequality 
approach. A much more complicated scenario would be described by a situation 
where half of the world population emitted a high level of CO2 to the atmosphere 
while the other half did not emit. The existent split, descriptive of an extreme duality, 
would a priori significantly complicate the achievement of agreements for reducing 
emissions, given the divergence of interests and the “force” of the groups—force 
linked to the size of the groups. In this last situation, standard inequality indexes 
would show lower values than in the former extreme case. Therefore, in this case, the 
employment of inequality measures would predictably contribute to bias our valuation 
of the seriousness of the situation. In order to solve this clear incapacity of inequality 
measures to show the degree of duality in a given distribution and its nexus with 
instability, the polarization approach has been developed in recent years. In fact, many 
of the relevant questions concerning international distribution of per capita CO2 
emissions could probably be more consistently dealt with the concept of polarization 
than with inequality, as might indicate the frequent arguments between high-polluting 
and low-polluting countries and groups of countries.  
 
Following the approach initially developed by Esteban and Ray (1994), polarization 
would depend on the following factors: 
i) Polarization is a groups’ issue. A lower number of groups tends to increase 
polarization. 
ii) Polarization depends on the size of groups. Groups of reduced size have small 
relevance for the generation of conflicts and polarization. 
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iii) The distance between groups. More heterogeneous groups increase the degree of 
polarization. 
iv) The level of cohesion. Internally homogeneous groups increase polarization. 
In order to make this notion operational, these authors initially proposed the ER 
indexes for income polarization measurement, with the following formulation, which 
we have adapted for the measurement of polarization in per capita CO2 emissions: 
 














     (1) 
where pi and pj are the relative populations of countries “i” and “j”; and ei and ej are 
the per capita CO2 emissions of both countries; e is the world average and  is a 
parameter measuring the level of sensitivity to polarization, which, by construction, 
would take values between 1 and 1.6. A greater value of  implies that the measure 
gives greater weight to the equalization of groups size than to other factors. In fact, 
the larger the value for  the greater the difference between this index and standard 
inequality measures, such as the Gini index. 
 
However, the ER index has some limitations, basically concerning its applicability. It 
does not provide criteria for grouping observations, meaning that its use is mainly 
advisable for analyzing predetermined groups. In order to resolve this restriction, 
Esteban et al. (1999) proposed the EGR indexes. These indexes would be consistent 
with endogenously defined groups and, as a consequence, their expression would 
include the groups' lack of cohesion. Formally, EGR indexes, which we have adapted 

















  G Gs     (2) 
where is a parameter showing the measure sensitivity to the groups’ level of 
cohesion, G is the Gini coefficient of the original distribution and Gs is the Gini of 
grouped distribution (inter-group inequality).  
 
With regard to the value to be taken by the parameter this is free. However, we can 
make some general indications. Note that ER and EGR indexes have the Gini 
coefficients as a reference. In short, the ER index, which is the first term of expression 
(2), is an index that can adopt values close to the Gini
5
. The second term in (2) is, in 
fact, a Gini difference. It would therefore seem reasonable, in terms of scale, to set a 
statistical value for  close to the unit. 
 
Although the EGR index is not uniformly bounded, given its relationship with the 
Gini coefficient we can interpret that a value close to 1 is indicative of high 




The procedure, then, consists of establishing the limits of groups in such a way that 
the internal disparities in each group are minimized (optimal groups). As far as the 
specific minimization procedure is concerned, this coincides with that suggested by 
Davies and Shorrocks (1989), in which the cut-off point between groups is defined by 
                                                 
5
 Both indexes would coincide if was equal to 0. 
6
 In the field of inequality measurement there are also indexes, such as the Theil index, which are not 
uniformly upper-bounded (see Theil, 1967). 
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the average weighted emission (income in the original formulation) of the two 
adjacent groups. 
 
With respect to the specific choice of the number of groups, several studies show that 
no significant explanatory gains take place from four groups upwards
7
, which is 
clearly supported by our results shown in Table 4. It may be tempting to use the intra-
group level of inequality (the internal cohesion of groups) for the precise selection of 
the appropriate number of groups. However, this method would tend to prioritize the 
distributions represented by a large number of groups, which reduces the own interest 
of polarization analysis. In our opinion, a useful criterion might be to observe the 
value thrown up by the EGR index. The underlying intuition is the following. Any 
increase in the number of groups, on the one hand, tends to lead to smaller 
aggregation errors, and therefore to produce higher EGR values but, on the other 
hand, also contributes to reduce the ER value and, as a consequence, the EGR. 
Therefore, the final value adopted by the index could be perceived as a broad 
indication of which is the prevailing channel.  
 
These EGR indexes have been widely used with the object of characterizing the 
evolution of personal income distributions. For example, Esteban et al. (1999) show 
specific pioneer evidence for the case of Spain, Gradín and Rossi (2000) for Uruguay, 
and D’Ambrosio (2001) for Italy. For the international case there is, e.g. the work by 
Duro (2005). 
 
                                                 
7
 See the evidence obtained by Davies and Shorrocks (1989), Esteban et al. (1999), Gradín (2000), and 
Duro (2006).  
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Nevertheless, some comments regarding other indexes of polarization may be 
instructive. Among the alternatives, we have to underline the measure proposed by 
Wolfson (1994). The main appeal of the Wolfson measure (W) is its direct derivation 
from the well-known Lorenz curve. In specific terms, its value would be graphically 
represented as all the area between the Lorenz curve and the tangent corresponding to 
average income (emission in our analysis). However, one of its main limitations is 
that it is only useful for analyzing the bipolarization case, meaning that it is 
inappropriate for examining other multipolar representations. Furthermore, as shown 
by Esteban et al. (1999), W may be interpreted as a particular case of EGR when the 
parameters  and  take a unitary value and median income (emission in our analysis) 
is used to separate the groups instead of the average. It is thus a measure with a low 
sensitivity to polarization, meaning that it might be interesting to check what happens 
with higher values of the parameter . Zhang and Kanbur (2001), on the other hand, 
suggested the use of the inter-group inequality/intra-group inequality ratio as an 
indicator of the level of polarization for a given distribution (ZK index). However, 
this measure seems fairly unsatisfactory, as it violates most of the previously cited 
properties established by Esteban and Ray (1994) for a consistent measure of 
polarization. In short, for instance it does not fulfill the second of the properties, 
giving a very high value for isolated observations concentrating most of the income 




3. International Polarization in per capita CO2 emissions: main empirical results 
                                                 
8
 Besides property 2, the ZK index does not fulfill properties 1 and 4 either. 
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Data on population and CO2 emissions from fuel combustion have been taken from 
International Energy Agency (2003)
9
. After detailed analysis of the statistical 
information available, a sample of 116 countries covering the period 1971–2001 was 
considered. This sample is highly representative, insofar as it represents more than 
99% of the world population and CO2 emissions from fuel combustion.  In order to 




Tables 1, 2, 3 and Figure 1 show the results obtained after applying the EGR indexes 
for the case of two, three and four optimal groups, respectively. In order to evaluate 




[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                 
9
 The emissions from the IEA do not include the emissions which do not derive from the combustion of 
fossil fuels, such as the generated by cement production and biomass burning. Thus, this data might 
tend to underestimate the emissions from poor countries as biomass combustion is relatively important 
in these countries, and it is not always burnt in a sustainable way. 
10
 The data for other years is available on request to the authors. We have included 1992, year of the 
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, and 1997, the year in which Kyoto Protocol negotiations took place. 
11
 The results derived from other parameter combinations may be requested from the authors. They do 
not differ significantly from those reported in this paper. We have highlighted in bold letters the results 
for the parameter values which are most commonly used in the literature, =1.3 and =1. 
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[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
These results show a declining pattern referred to polarization during the period 
considered
12
. In fact, the values obtained for the EGR index for two, three and four 
groups show a clearly decreasing trend for any parametric combination. The reduction 
is especially significant for the analysis grouping countries into two and three groups, 
and less pronounced for the grouping of countries in four groups
13
. However, there is 
not too much reduction in polarization with respect to 1995, year in which there was 
abundant evidence of the phenomenon, nor with respect to 1997, when the 
negotiations on the Protocol took place. There has even been a small increase for the 
cases of 2 and 4 groups of countries. This might indicate that the unequal and 
polarized distribution of emissions across countries, which has not decreased in last 
few years, is still one of the important factors implying difficulties in the achievement 
of new arrangements going further than the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
At this point, and besides the time analysis of polarization, we can also analyze which 
group classification is a more attractive description of the phenomenon of 
polarization. That is, which number of groups is more appealing for explaining the 
                                                 
12
 CO2 polarization was greater than income polarization at the beginning of the period (see, for 
example, Duro, 2005), although it has experienced a stronger reduction so they are now very similar. 
This similarity might indicate that the polarization in emissions could be explained to a great extent by 
the polarization in income. 
13
 We have also carried out a comparative analysis of the time patterns followed by polarization and 
inequality values using the Gini index. We found that there has also been a clear reduction in CO2 
inequality over the period considered. Therefore, the measurements of both distributive 
conceptualizations have tended to a lower disequilibrium. Results are available upon request. 
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degree of per capita emissions polarization. An initial way of checking the capacity of 
the various cases analyzed could be to use the percentage with respect to the 
inequality of the original CO2 distribution that represents the inequality between 
groups of the simplified distribution in groups, as an indicator of the error incurred by 
the grouping process. This would mean calculating the ratio Gs/G. Table 4 is attached 
for this purpose. A high explanatory capacity for the three cases can initially be seen. 
Thus, the simplification of the distribution in only two groups of countries contributes 
to explaining almost 80% of the international differences in per capita emissions. If 
we consider three groups instead of two, which logically produces an improvement in 
the fit, this allows to explain 90% of the differences, a very significant percentage. 
Note that changing from three to four groups does not involve an important 
explanatory improvement. Given that the additional objective, besides working with a 
small aggregation error, consists of simplifying the relevant number of groups, our 
analysis would lead to reject the more detailed description in four groups, in favor of 
the other two descriptions (two and three groups). However, choosing which of these 
two representations is more appealing is not easy. Despite the gain observed in the 
explanatory capacity with the distribution associated with three groups, this does not 
seem apparently sufficient to choose it instead of the two-group distribution, which is 
very simple and has a low-aggregation error. The value shown by the own 
polarization index may shed some light on this situation
14
. It is thereby confirmed that 
in most cases, the EGR value for two groups exceeds the one produced by the EGR 
                                                 
14
 As we previously noted, any increase in the number of groups, on one hand leads to smaller 
aggregation errors, and so to higher EGR values but, on the other hand, reduces the ER value (see 
property 1 above) and, as a consequence, the EGR one. Hence, the value of the index could be 
perceived as a broad indication of which is the prevailing channel. 
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for three groups. Only in the cases where the weighting of the aggregation error—the 
value of parameter —is high, the choice would be the three groups alternative. 
 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Therefore, there seems to be a clear superiority of the simplified representation in two 
groups, in front of the choice of three groups. Table 5 and Figure 2 show the main 
descriptive traits of these two groups, as well as their evolution in the selected years 
of the sample used. In this way, we can observe that the reduction in the distributive 
duality above mentioned is mainly attributed to the reduction in the differences in the 
(relative) average emissions of the two groups (i.e. a process of convergence to the 
mean among groups. The countries with below average per capita emissions have 
moved from emitting a level of 21% of the world average in 1971 to emitting 39% in 
2001. Concerning the most polluting countries, they have moved from a level of 
emissions of 305% of the world average to 279%, always in per capita terms. 
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Table 6 and Figure 3 show the main descriptive treats of the groups in the three-
groups case, as well as their evolution over the years of the sample. We can see that, 
with division into three groups, at the end of the period the poles are more 
homogeneous, but the much lower differences between them explain the overall 
reduction in polarization. 
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[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
It should be highlighted that in the classification into two groups deriving from the 
analysis, the Above-average group broadly coincides with Annex B of the Kyoto 
Protocol (See Appendix A.1), with some oil suppliers countries and few more 
countries with relatively small population weights. Thus, all countries that pledged to 
target their greenhouse gases emissions under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B of the 
Protocol) are included in this group. In the case of three groups, all these countries are 
placed in the High-emissions group, while in the less relevant case of four groups, 
these countries are placed in the medium-high and high emissions groups. Thus, the 
optimal groups determined by the polarization approach broadly coincide with the real 
groups formed in Kyoto negotiations. This evidence reinforces the validity of our 
analysis and opens new ways for understanding negotiation processes and their final 
results. 
 
Table 7 shows the results for a polarization analysis with an exogenous grouping in 
Annex B and non-Annex B countries. That is, now the EGR indexes do not take the 
groups formed in an optimal way—by setting their limits according to their degree of 
similarity in terms of per capita emissions—but the groups that were formed in real 
negotiations. As we can see, the results are very similar to the endogenous two groups 
case. The last column shows the degree to which this exogenous classification into 
Annex B and non-Annex B countries is able to explain overall inequality, that is to 
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say, the percentage that represents between groups’ inequality with respect to overall 
inequality (GS/G) (the aggregation error). These results show polarization between 
these groups has undergone a greater reduction than polarization between the 
endogenously determined groups. While at the beginning of the period the grouping 
into Annex B and non-Annex B countries explained 81.4% of total inequality (only 
three points less than the inequality between endogenous groups), it now explains 
69.1% of it (9.4 points less than the inequality between endogenous groups). In spite 
of this reduction, this is still a very remarkable percentage of overall inequality.  
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Nevertheless, although the analysis of polarization in emissions shows a significant 
part of the picture, it also should be taken into account that there are other distributive 
issues to be taken into account in order to undertake a more comprehensive analysis 
of the convergence in interests across countries and so in the environment for 
achieving agreements in climate change policies. It would be an interesting field for 
future research to contrast these results with other distributions related to climate 
change that might affect the convergence/divergence of interests, such as the 
distribution of the impacts of climate change, differences in income, differences in the 
vulnerability and capacity of adaptation to climate change, and differences in the 




4. Results for the case without population weighting and for a reduced sample 
excluding China and India  
                                                 
15
 As a reviewer noticed, taking this last point into account, it is not strange that oil exporting countries 
are the countries that made more opposition to climate change policies. 
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The results of the previous section are based on weighted polarization indexes; that is, 
the observations of countries have a non-uniform treatment, but are weighted 
according to their population. We think this is the most reasonable option. In any case, 
in this scenario the behavior over time of countries with larger populations, such as 
China or India, might cause a great impact on the polarization values and the results 
obtained in the previous section. However, it might be thought that in terms of 
political conflict, the weight of countries might not be exactly proportional to their 
population share. It is therefore interesting to compare the previous results with the 
results under other assumptions. In this case, we have recomputed the polarization 
index values considering the different observations in a uniform way. Table 8 shows 
the results. 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
It must be highlighted that the values found for polarization under this assumption are 
much lower. However, the results do not lead to different qualitative conclusions than 
the computations with population weightings, and also show a reduction in per capita 
CO2 polarization across countries. However, these results should be taken into 
account with caution, as not weighting the observations for countries implies 
considering countries with less than 500,000 inhabitants, such as Gibraltar, Iceland or 
Brunei, and countries such as China (1,300 millions) or India (1,000 millions) in the 
same way. 
 
China and India have experienced a great economic growth, as well as a great increase 
in emissions in recent years. Given their large populations it would be interesting to 
check to what extent global polarization results have been influenced by the behavior 
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of these countries. We have recomputed the polarization indexes excluding China and 
India from the sample, countries whose great population and impressive increase in 
emissions might have strongly influenced the evolution of global polarization values 
computed in the previous section. Table 9 shows the results, for the polarization 




[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
These results contrast with the evidence indicated for the complete sample. 
Polarization values at the beginning of the period are much lower than in the complete 
sample, and there is a very small reduction, so that at the end of the period the values 
are even larger than in the complete sample. There is even an increase for the case of 
four groups. Given the EGR polarization index values obtained, it seems that the 
simplification of the distribution in two groups is again the most appealing one.  
 
Excluding these two countries from the sample, polarization values at the end of the 
period are very similar to the ones at the beginning. Therefore, these results clearly 
show the great importance in the global reduction of polarization played by the 
behavior of these countries, which have experienced a great increase in emissions, 
increasing their per capita levels, and bringing the level of emissions of the low-level 
group nearer the level of emissions of the high-level group
17
.  
                                                 
16
In this case we fix=1.3 and =1. The results for the rest of parameter combinations may be 
requested to the authors. They do not differ significantly from those reported in this paper. 
17
 In this case there might be differences in the time trends of polarization and inequality indexes. In 
short, while reference polarization measures slowly decline and were stable since 1990, the inequality 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
The analysis of polarization provides a useful analytical framework from which 
understanding the inherent degree of conflict in the international distribution of per 
capita CO2 emissions. The analysis of the potentiality of conflict between countries by 
means of the distributive polarization approach is quite appealing as the current 
international context is characterized by the need of achieving agreements between 
countries with different interests which tend form groups in order to maximize 
negotiation achievements. In this sense, the paper maintains the hypothesis that a 
greater split by groups of countries in the international distribution of CO2 would 
imply a scenario of greater potential appearance of conflicts and, therefore, of 
difficulties to achieve agreement. Moreover, inequality measures are not appropriate 
for analyzing distributive rupture.  
 
In this paper, the level of polarization in the international distribution of per capita 
CO2 emissions has been analyzed for the period 1971-2001 adapting to this analysis 
the EGR index (Esteban et al., 1999) originally designed for income distribution 
analysis. According to the results obtained, the following comments may be made.  
 
First, international polarization in emissions has been reduced in a significant way 
over the last thirty years. This lower level of fragmentation has been proved for the 
description with two, three and four groups, and for various parametric combinations 
of the polarization indexes. The trend since 1990, reference year for the Kyoto 
                                                                                                                                            
measure, where countries are not weighted, experienced a significant growth. More details are available 
on request to the authors. 
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Protocol, is also a declining one. However, there is not much reduction with respect to 
1995, nor with respect to 1997. Then, the polarization in the distribution of 
international emissions in 2001 does not show a better situation for facilitating 
agreements than the one in 1997, when the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol took 
place. It would be of great interest to analyze the evolution of polarization in 
emissions in the future in order to analyze how emissions distribution—among other 
factors to be considered that we have previously cited—might facilitate or not future 
agreements on reductions. 
 
Second, the most appealing structure for the polarization analysis is the one with two 
groups, given that it better combines the condition of considering a minimum number 
of groups with a reduced aggregation error. The simplification that provides worst 
results is the one with four groups. Regarding the classification into two optimal 
groups derived from the polarization analysis, the Above average group broadly 
coincides with Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol (see Appendix A.1), with some oil-
supplying countries and few more countries with a relatively small population 
weighting. All countries that pledged to target their greenhouse gas emissions under 
the Kyoto Protocol are included in this group. In the case of three groups, all these 
countries are placed in the High emissions group. Therefore, polarization analysis 
with these endogenously determined groups broadly coincides with the polarization 
between Annex B parties and other groups of countries. Furthermore, the groups 
endogenously chosen (theoretical groups) broadly coincide with the groups formed in 
the real Kyoto negotiations. This analogy, among other aspects, reinforces the 
usefulness of the analysis and opens up new ways for understanding negotiation 
processes and their final results. 
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Finally, various additional exercises have been undertaken. The computation of the 
indexes in their non-weighted version has shown a clear decline in polarization over 
the period considered, coinciding with the previous results. The exclusion of China 
and India from the sample leads to lower polarization values at the beginning of the 
period and a much smaller reduction over the period, which shows the importance of 
the increase in emissions in these large countries in explaining global polarization 
values and their decreasing trend.  
 
Polarization indexes constitute a good instrument for undertaking a distributive 
analysis especially different from the distributive analysis undertaken in other 
environmental studies. In short, this analysis contributes to clarify the degree of 
potential tension and instability that arises from the international distribution of 
emissions, tension that would be associated to the existence of groups with opposing 
interests, which have internal cohesion and are of great size. Therefore, both 
polarization and inequality indexes are useful tools for the examination of 
international distribution of emissions and its potential consequences. 
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Appendix A. Groups of countries derived from polarization analysis 
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A.1. Optimal Groups: two groups case, year 2001 
Below average group: Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia & Eritrea, 
Mozambique, United Republic of Tanzania, Myanmar, Nepal, Other Africa, Zambia, 
Cameroon, Haiti, Other Asia, Togo, Sudan, Bangladesh, Congo, Benin, Kenya, 
Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Angola, Yemen, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, 
Vietnam, Pakistan, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Philippines, Peru, 
Zimbabwe, Bolivia, India, Albania, Morocco, Costa Rica, Colombia, Gabon, 
Indonesia, Uruguay, Ecuador, Panamá, Egypt, Brazil, Tunisia, Dominican Republic, 
Algeria, China, Thailand, Turkey, Cuba, Jordan, Chile, Syria, Argentina, Other Latin 
America, Dem. People's Republic of Korea, Iraq, Lebanon, Mexico.  
Above average group: Jamaica, Romania, Former Yugoslavia, Malaysia, Iran, 
Venezuela, Malta, Sweden, Hungary, Bulgaria, Hong-Kong, Portugal, Switzerland, 
France, Spain, South Africa, Slovak Republic, Italy, Lybia, Iceland, Poland, Former 
USSR, Cyprus, Austria, Greece, Norway, New Zealand, Japan, United Kingdom, 
Korea, Denmark, Oma, Taipei, Israel, Germany, Netherlands, Singapore, Ireland, 
Czech Republic, Finland, Belgium, Trinidad, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Gibraltar, Canada, 
Australia, Luxembourg, United States, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar. 
 
A.2. Optimal Groups: three groups case, year 2001 
Low emissions group: Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia & Eritrea, 
Mozambique, United Republic of Tanzania, Myanmar, Nepal, Other Africa, Zambia, 
Cameroon, Haiti, Other Asia, Togo, Sudan, Bangladesh, Congo, Benin, Kenya, 
Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Angola, Yemen, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, 
Vietnam, Pakistan, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Philippines, Peru, 
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Zimbabwe, Bolivia, India, Albania, Morocco, Costa Rica, Colombia, Gabon, 
Indonesia, Uruguay, Ecuador. 
Medium emissions group: Panamá, Egypt, Brazil, Tunisia, Dominican Republic, 
Algeria, China, Thailand, Turkey, Cuba, Jordan, Chile, Syria, Argentina, Other Latin 
America, Dem. People's Republic of Korea, Iraq, Lebanon, Mexico. 
High emissions group: Jamaica, Romania, Former Yugoslavia, Malaysia, Iran, 
Venezuela, Malta, Sweden, Hungary, Bulgaria, Hong-Kong, Portugal, Switzerland, 
France, Spain, South Africa, Slovak Republic, Italy, Lybia, Iceland, Poland, Former 
USSR, Cyprus, Austria, Greece, Norway, New Zealand, Japan, United Kingdom, 
Korea, Denmark, Oma, Taipei, Israel, Germany, Netherlands, Singapore, Ireland, 
Czech Republic, Finland, Belgium, Trinidad, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Gibraltar, Canada, 
Australia, Luxembourg, United States, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar. 
 
A.3. Optimal Groups: four groups case, year 2001 
Low emissions group: Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia & Eritrea, 
Mozambique, United Republic of Tanzania, Myanmar, Nepal, Other Africa, Zambia, 
Cameroon, Haiti, Other Asia, Togo, Sudan, Bangladesh, Congo, Benin, Kenya, 
Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Angola, Yemen, Paraguay, Sri Lanka, 
Vietnam, Pakistan, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Philippines, Peru, 
Zimbabwe, Bolivia, India, Albania, Morocco, Costa Rica, Colombia, Gabon, 
Indonesia, Uruguay, Ecuador. 
Medium-low emissions group: Panamá, Egypt, Brazil, Tunisia, Dominican Republic, 
Algeria, China, Thailand, Turkey, Cuba, Jordan, Chile, Syria, Argentina, Other Latin 
America, Dem. People's Republic of Korea, Iraq, Lebanon, Mexico. 
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Medium-high emissions group: Jamaica, Romania, Former Yugoslavia, Malaysia, 
Iran, Venezuela, Malta, Sweden, Hungary, Bulgaria, Hong-Kong, Portugal, 
Switzerland, France, Spain, South Africa, Slovak Republic, Italy, Lybia, Iceland, 
Poland, Former USSR, Cyprus, Austria, Greece, Norway, New Zealand, Japan, 
United Kingdom, Korea, Denmark, Oma, Taipei, Israel, Germany. 
High emissions group: Netherlands, Singapore, Ireland, Czech Republic, Finland, 
Belgium, Trinidad, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Gibraltar, Canada, Australia, Luxembourg, 






Table 1. Inter-country two groups polarization of per capita CO2 emissions, 
weighted computations, complete sample, 1971-2001 

  = 0.5  = 1  = 1.5 
  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6 
1971 0.5178 0.4289 0.3597 0.4653 0.3764 0.3073 0.4128 0.3239 0.2548 
1975 0.5051 0.4182 0.3506 0.4535 0.3666 0.2990 0.4019 0.3150 0.2474 
1980 0.4893 0.4056 0.3405 0.4363 0.3526 0.2875 0.3833 0.2996 0.2346 
1985 0.4659 0.3869 0.3258 0.4099 0.3309 0.2698 0.3540 0.2750 0.2139 
1990 0.4420 0.3661 0.3072 0.3846 0.3087 0.2499 0.3273 0.2513 0.1925 
1992 0.4244 0.3516 0.2953 0.3652 0.2924 0.2361 0.3060 0.2332 0.1769 
1995 0.3935 0.3253 0.2728 0.3306 0.2624 0.2099 0.2677 0.1995 0.1470 
1997 0.3891 0.3209 0.2682 0.3248 0.2566 0.2039 0.2605 0.1922 0.1395 
2001 0.3931 0.3255 0.2734 0.3306 0.2629 0.2108 0.2680 0.2003 0.1482 
Source: Own elaboration based on International Energy Agency (2003) data. 
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Table 2. Inter-country three groups polarization of per capita CO2 emissions, 
weighted computations, complete sample, 1971-2001 
 
  = 0.5  = 1  = 1.5 
  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6 
1971 0.4644 0.3794 0.3175 0.4393 0.3543 0.2925 0.4143 0.3292 0.2674 
1975 0.4427 0.3536 0.2889 0.4144 0.3253 0.2605 0.3860 0.2970 0.2322 
1980 0.4308 0.3458 0.2842 0.4023 0.3173 0.2557 0.3738 0.2888 0.2271 
1985 0.3379 0.2338 0.1600 0.3091 0.2050 0.1312 0.2803 0.1762 0.1024 
1990 0.3330 0.2343 0.1642 0.3053 0.2065 0.1364 0.2775 0.1787 0.1086 
1992 0.3266 0.2301 0.1615 0.2992 0.2026 0.1340 0.2717 0.1751 0.1064 
1995 0.3171 0.2238 0.1574 0.2900 0.1967 0.1303 0.2629 0.1696 0.1032 
1997 0.3143 0.2209 0.1545 0.2867 0.1934 0.1270 0.2592 0.1659 0.0995 
2001 0.3086 0.2152 0.1488 0.2802 0.1868 0.1205 0.2519 0.1585 0.0921 
Source: Own elaboration based on International Energy Agency (2003) data. 
 34 
 
Table 3. Inter-country four groups polarization of per capita CO2 emissions, 
weighted computations, complete sample, 1971-2001 
 
  = 0.5  = 1  = 1.5 
  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6 
1971 0.3074 0.2071 0.1406 0.2954 0.1951 0.1286 0.2834 0.1831 0.1166 
1975 0.3047 0.2063 0.1406 0.2923 0.1940 0.1283 0.2800 0.1816 0.1159 
1980 0.3008 0.2043 0.1396 0.2879 0.1914 0.1267 0.2751 0.1786 0.1139 
1985 0.2988 0.2031 0.1390 0.2855 0.1898 0.1257 0.2722 0.1766 0.1125 
1990 0.2867 0.1947 0.1332 0.2735 0.1816 0.1201 0.2604 0.1685 0.1070 
1992 0.2818 0.1930 0.1331 0.2680 0.1791 0.1192 0.2541 0.1653 0.1053 
1995 0.2769 0.1914 0.1335 0.2645 0.1789 0.1210 0.2520 0.1664 0.1085 
1997 0.2753 0.1902 0.1327 0.2625 0.1774 0.1199 0.2497 0.1646 0.1070 
2001 0.2772 0.1928 0.1354 0.2642 0.1797 0.1223 0.2511 0.1667 0.1093 
Source: Own elaboration based on International Energy Agency (2003) data. 
 35 
 








1971 84.5% 92.6% 96.4% 
1975 84.4% 91.4% 96.3% 
1980 83.7% 91.2% 96.0% 
1985 82.3% 90.9% 95.8% 
1990 81.3% 91.0% 95.7% 
1992 80.3% 90.9% 95.4% 
1995 78.4% 90.7% 95.7% 
1997 77.9% 90.5% 95.6% 
2001 78.5% 90.2% 95.6% 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on International Energy Agency (2003) data. 
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Table 5. Two groups case. Description of groups 
 
 Low emissions group High emissions group 
 p ei/e p ei/e 
1971 0.72 0.21 0.28 3.05 
1975 0.72 0.23 0.28 3.00 
1980 0.73 0.25 0.27 2.99 
1985 0.74 0.29 0.26 2.98 
1990 0.73 0.33 0.27 2.88 
1992 0.74 0.35 0.26 2.85 
1995 0.74 0.39 0.26 2.78 
1997 0.74 0.39 0.26 2.74 
2001 0.75 0.39 0.25 2.79 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on International Energy Agency (2003) data. 
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Table 6. Three groups case. Description of groups  
 Low emissions group Medium emissions 
group 
High emissions group 
 p ei/e P ei/e p ei/e 
1971 0.69 0.18 0.20 1.83 0.11 4.58 
1975 0.66 0.19 0.16 1.37 0.18 3.66 
1980 0.67 0.21 0.17 1.49 0.16 3.80 
1985 0.39 0.11 0.37 0.54 0.24 3.13 
1990 0.45 0.16 0.33 0.74 0.22 3.21 
1992 0.45 0.17 0.33 0.76 0.22 3.10 
1995 0.46 0.19 0.33 0.79 0.21 3.05 
1997 0.43 0.18 0.36 0.78 0.21 3.04 
2001 0.43 0.19 0.35 0.72 0.22 3.02 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on International Energy Agency (2003) data. 
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Table 7. Exogenous grouping in Annex B and non-Annex B countries 
 
 
  = 0.5  = 1  = 1.5 Explanatory 
Power 
  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6  = 1  = 1.3  = 1.6  
1971 0.4871 0.3991 0.3303 0.4244 0.3364 0.2676 0.3617 0.2737 0.2049 81.4% 
1975 0.4759 0.3917 0.3261 0.4145 0.3304 0.2648 0.3532 0.2690 0.2035 81.4% 
1980 0.4528 0.3738 0.3125 0.3877 0.3086 0.2474 0.3226 0.2435 0.1822 79.9% 
1985 0.4255 0.3520 0.2954 0.3561 0.2826 0.2260 0.2867 0.2132 0.1566 78.1% 
1990 0.3957 0.3281 0.2764 0.3229 0.2553 0.2036 0.2501 0.1825 0.1308 76.3% 
1992 0.3717 0.3077 0.2589 0.2949 0.2309 0.1821 0.2181 0.1542 0.1054 74.5% 
1995 0.3286 0.2707 0.2266 0.2440 0.1861 0.1421 0.1595 0.1016 0.0575 71.0% 
1997 0.3174 0.2612 0.2186 0.2292 0.1730 0.1304 0.1409 0.0847 0.0421 69.7% 
2001 0.3114 0.2569 0.2157 0.2216 0.1671 0.1259 0.1318 0.0772 0.0361 69.1% 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on International Energy Agency (2003) data. 
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Table 8. Inter-country polarization of per capita CO2 emissions, non-weighted 
indexes, 1971-2001 
 
 EGR-2 EGR-3 EGR-4 
1971 0.2847 0.2407 0.1819 
1975 0.2636 0.2296 0.1765 
1980 0.2467 0.2198 0.1627 
1985 0.2357 0.2171 0.1714 
1990 0.2214 0.2068 0.1506 
1992 0.2149 0.2060 0.1524 
1995 0.2113 0.2058 0.1573 
1997 0.2092 0.2041 0.1561 
2001 0.2134 0.2064 0.1636 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on International Energy Agency (2003) data. 
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Table 9. Inter-country polarization of per capita CO2 emissions, China and India 
excluded 1971–2001 
 EGR-2 EGR-3 EGR-4 
1971 0.2595 0.2475 0.1331 
1975 0.2677 0.2455 0.1693 
1980 0.2662 0.2184 0.1673 
1985 0.2659 0.2186 0.1672 
1990 0.2586 0.2302 0.1618 
1992 0.2588 0.2256 0.1635 
1995 0.2512 0.2279 0.1677 
1997 0.2429 0.2312 0.1726 
2001 0.2470 0.2320 0.1630 
Source: Own elaboration based on International Energy Agency (2003) data. 
 
 41 
Figure 1. Inter-country polarization of CO2 emissions, complete sample, 1971– 










































Source: Own elaboration based on International Energy Agency (2003) data. 
Note: EGRs are computed for polarization parameters =1.3 and =1. 
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Figure 2. Two groups representation. Comparison between 1971 and 2001   
           
          p 
 ei/e 
Source: Own elaboration based on International Energy Agency (2003) data. 
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Figure 3. Three groups representation. Comparison between 1971 and 2001. 
p 
 ei/e 
Source: Own elaboration based on International Energy Agency (2003) data. 
 
 
